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CONTRACT DESIGN WITH LIMITED COMMITMENT
VITALI GRETSCHKO AND ACHIM WAMBACH
ZEW MANNHEIM AND UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM
Abstract. We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a pri-
vately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any mechanism.
That is, we allow the principal, after observing the outcome of a mechanism to rene-
gotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number
of times. We provide a general characterization of renegotiation-proof states of such a
renegotiation. The proposed solution concept provides an effective and easy-to-use tool
to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept
to a setting with a continuous type space, private values and non-linear contracts. We
find that the optimal contracts for the principal are pooling and satisfy a “no-distortion-
at-the-bottom” property.
JEL classification: C72, C73, C78, D82
Keywords: Principal-Agent models, renegotiation, commitment, Coase-conjecture
1. Introduction
Motivation and results. Consider the problem of a principal (she) who is endowed
with all the bargaining power and wishes to contract with a privately informed agent
(he). As a consequence of the revelation principle, we can usually dispense with the
details of the particular procedure that the principal may use to close the contract and
focus on direct revelation mechanisms (Myerson, 1979). This approach is valid only
if the principal honors the rules of the proposed mechanism and the agent trusts that
this is the case. By playing the mechanism, however, the agent reveals information and
the contracts resulting from optimal mechanisms are typically inefficient. Both parties
therefore can benefit if the resulting contract is renegotiated, that is, if the principal
proposes a new mechanism after observing the outcome of the original mechanism. In
this case, the agent may decide whether to participate in the new mechanism or whether
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to stick to the original contract. If he decides to participate in the new mechanism, the
contract resulting of this new mechanism can still also be subject to renegotiation. If
the principal cannot commit to not renegotiating any contract and there is no deadline
that puts an end to the renegotiation, backward induction cannot be applied and the
revelation principle is hard to restore.1
We follow Gretschko and Wambach (2016) and characterize the set of renegotiation-
proof states of such a (re-)negotiation.2 A state of the negotiation is a tuple consisting of
the current signed contract of the agent and the belief of the principal that was formed
by observing the previous choices of the agent.3 A state is said to be renegotiation-proof
if the principal will not propose a new mechanism once such a state has been reached.
Renegotiation-proof states are not identified one-by-one but simultaneously as a set. The
key insight is that whether a state is renegotiation-proof or not will depend on whether
it can be improved by other renegotiation-proof states. A state is said to be improved
by another set of states if there is a mechanism which leads from the initial state to the
other states and which makes (all types of) the agent and the principal (for the given
belief) better off. In essence, renegotiation-proof states cannot be improved by other
renegotiation-proof states while states that are not renegotiation proof can be improved
by renegotiation-proof states.
The characterization of the set of renegotiation-proof states therefore is based on
two simple properties. First, for every renegotiation-proof state there are no other
renegotiation-proof states that can be reached by proposing a new mechanism and would
make the principal strictly better off (internal consistency). Second, in any state of the
negotiation it is feasible to reach renegotiation-proof states by proposing a new mech-
anism (external consistency).4 Both properties reflect the sequential rationality of the
1Thus, Bester and Strausz (2001) cannot be directly applied.
2We extend the definitions in Gretschko and Wambach (2016) by considering arbitrary type spaces and
not merely discrete ones.
3We focus on states rather than contracts as whether the principal would like to renegotiate the currently
signed contract crucially depends on her belief.
4Without frictions, every history of the negotiation can be represented as a single-stage mechanism.
Thus, for the definition of renegotiation-proofness it is sufficient to consider only a single-stage mech-
anism. Put differently, every equilibrium of a subgame starting at some history can be represented by
a single-stage mechanism that is incentive compatible for the agent. That is, if after some history an
equilibrium eventually induces a type conditioned lottery over contracts and posterior beliefs, then there
is an incentive compatible single-stage mechanism that induces the same type dependent lotteries and
generates at least as high payoff to the principal.
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principal. Suppose the negotiation reaches a renegotiation-proof state and the princi-
pal proposes a new mechanism. External consistency ensures that by proposing a new
mechanism she will renegotiate to reach renegotiation-proof states. Internal consistency
implies that the resulting states do not make the principal better off than the original
state would have. 5
One of the main advantages of a general characterization of renegotiation-proof states
is that it provides an effective and easy-to-use tool to analyze specific instances of the
general problem. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous type space,
private values and non-linear contracts.6 This setting encompasses many applications in
which it is natural for the principal to suffer from the inability to rule out renegotiation
like selling when price and quality matter, procurement, or franchising. As the principal
example of the setting we use that of a seller selling a good to a privately informed buyer.
The contracts consist of two dimensions: price and quality.
With full commitment, it is optimal for the principal to offer a continuum of contracts,
the types fully separate with only the highest type receiving an efficient contract. This
is the well-known “no-distortion-at-the-top” result. Clearly this is not sustainable if the
principal is not able to commit. If there is full separation of types with inefficient con-
tracts, the principal must know the type of the agent and could propose a new, strictly
better, mechanism offering efficient quality to each type.
We show that without commitment the set of optimal renegotiation-proof contracts for
the principal has the following features.7 Firstly, the principal offers a countably infinite
number of contracts. Secondly, each contract is signed by a pool of types of the agent
that is of positive measure. Thirdly, the lowest type in each pool receives an efficient
contract, every other type in each pool receives an inefficient contract. Thus, the result
differs markedly from the full-commitment benchmark.
To prove the result, we start by showing that renegotiation-proof states must be either
efficient and separating or pooling so that one of the types in the pool receives his efficient
5The proposed solution concept is closely related to the approach introduced by Vartiainen (2013) to
analyze auctions without commitment. We comment on the relationship below and in in Section 6.
6A setting similar to Mussa and Rosen (1978).
7To improve readability, we will sometimes speak of renegotiation-proof contracts rather then
renegotiation-proof states. A renegotiation-proof contract is then a contract that with an appropriate
belief of the principal can constitute a renegotiation-proof state in the sense described above.
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quality.8 Pooling states where one of the agent types receives his efficient quality can
be renegotiation-proof if the only other renegotiation-proof states that can be reached,
starting from the pooling state, are efficient and separating. This is due to the fact that
such states do not make the principal strictly better off in comparison to the pooling
states. Having defined the general structure of renegotiation-proof states, we show that,
optimally, the principal offers a mechanism that leads to pooling contracts only. In each
pool, the lowest type will receive his efficient quality. That is, there is “no distortion at
the bottom”. This is due to the fact that efficient and separating contracts would imply
a high information rent to the agent which can be reduced by offering pooling contracts
instead. Thus, efficient and separating contracts cannot be optimal. Moreover, if the
principal needs to provide efficient quality to one type in each pool, it is optimal to do
so for the lowest type. This allows the principal to reduce the information rent of the
higher types in the other pools.
Our solution concept is closely related to the solution concept that Vartiainen (2013)
introduced to analyze auctions without commitment. Vartiainen specifies conditions that
are imposed on the mechanism selection strategy of the principal by sequential rationality.
He thereby identifies the selection strategies that the principal will not be tempted to
change.9 In particular, he requires that a mechanism selection strategy is consistent
and optimal. The former condition implies that employing the mechanism selection
strategy ex-ante should not contradict employing it ex-post. That is, if a mechanism
is chosen after some history, it should make the principal weakly better off than any of
the subsequent mechanisms prescribed by her mechanism selection strategy. The later
condition implies that the principal should choose a mechanism that maximizes her pay-
off among the mechanisms which are consistent with the selection strategy. Observe that
if the principal will not change her selection strategy after observing the play of the agent,
given that the agent plays truthfully, it is optimal for the agent to play the mechanism
8A state is efficient and separating if the the principal has a singleton belief about the type of agent and
the contract for this type is efficient. A state is pooling if the belief of the principal admits a positive
measure of types. To improve readability, we sometimes speak of pooling contracts and efficient and
separating contracts instead of states.
9As Vartiainen (2013) considers a situation with a total lack of commitment, his approach needs to be
adapted to our setting in which we focus on renegotiation. With a total lack of commitment the agent
does not have the option to retain the contract which was generated by a previous mechanism instead
of playing the new mechanism.
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truthfully.10 We demonstrate the equivalence between the solution concept introduced by
Vartiainen (2013) and our solution concept. On one hand, every consistent, optimal and
history independent selection strategy of the principal results in a renegotiation-proof set
of states. On the other hand, for any given set of renegotiation-proof states there exists
an consistent, optimal and history independent selection strategy that generates this set
of states.
The main advantage of abstracting from selection strategies and focus on renegotiation-
proof states only is that optimal and consistent selection strategies may be rather complex.
Thus, to demonstrate the cutting power of our solution concept, we analyze the famous
Coase (1972) conjecture and rederive the “gap - no gap” result in a simple way. That
is, we analyze the problem of a seller selling a durable good to a buyer who has private
information about his valuation where price is the only relevant dimension. We show
that if there is a gap between the cost of the seller and the lowest value of the buyer –
the “gap” case – the seller can at most charge a price equal to the lowest valuation of the
buyer. If the cost of the seller, however, is above the lowest valuation – the “no-gap” case
– the seller can charge the monopoly price (Ausubel and Deneckere, 1989).11
Vartiainen (2013) also analyzes the Coase conjecture and writes that in principle it
is possible to construct mechanism selection strategies that are consistent and optimal
for the no-gap case. However, those selection strategies would be complex. Thus, he
refrains from construction and makes the additional assumption that mechanism selection
strategies need to be stationary. In this case, even in the no-gap case, the seller sells at a
price equal to his costs. As we are able to rederive the “gap – no gap” result in a simple
way, we demonstrate that shifting the focus from mechanism selection strategies to states
simplifies the application of the solution concept.
Related literature. Gretschko andWambach (2016) show how renegotiation-proof states
arise as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the mechanism design game. Furthermore, they
apply the solution concept to different models with a discrete type space. They find that
10Playing the mechanism truthfully means choosing the message that gives the agent the best possible
payoff given her type (possibly mixing when indifferent).
11Liu et al. (2017) provide an interesting extension of (Ausubel and Deneckere, 1989) to auctions. They
show that without commitment the monopoly solution is not achievable. This result is corroborated by
Vartiainen (2013) who demonstrates that an English auction without reserve price is the only mechanism
that is implementable without commitment.
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with private values only efficient contracts are renegotiation-proof. With common values,
however, inefficient contracts can be renegotiation-proof. This finding is corroborated
by Strulovici (2017) who shows that if in a specific infinite-horizon bargaining protocol
friction disappears, efficient and fully separating contracts arise in any Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium if values are private and the type space is discrete.12 This is different to the
results provided in this manuscript, given that with a continuous type space, inefficient
contracts can be renegotiation-proof even in the case of private values. In the private
value case, for any pooling contract renegotiation towards efficient separating contracts
is feasible. It is also strictly profitable to the principal if types are discrete, thus pooling
cannot not be a renegotiation proof state. With continuous types, however, such a rene-
gotiation does not lead to an additional profit for the principal. More precisely, after any
history the principal can use Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms where the agent’s pay-
ment is the cost of provision to implement the efficient solution. With continuous types,
this payment schedule is unique up to an additive constant. Hence, the principal makes
a zero profit along the efficient path if the current contract is efficient for one of the types
of agent. Thus, the principal can commit to some inefficient contracts, as renegotiating
to efficient contracts would generate no additional profit for her. For discrete types, the
maximal profit from implementing efficient contracts starting from an inefficient one is
always positive. Thus, renegotiating to efficient contracts makes the principal always
better off. We do not take a stance on whether the discrete or the continuous type model
is the more relevant one. However, we like to point out that without commitment one
has to be careful about which model to use.
Asheim and Nilssen (1997) consider a monopolistic insurance market with a finite type-
space. They use assumptions regarding the characterization of renegotiation-proof states
which resemble our characterization. That is, they rely on properties similar to internal
and external consistency to characterize renegotiation-proof states. As in our case, this
approach proves to be very useful in deriving clear results for an otherwise very complex
problem.
12In a similar set-up, Maestri (2017) uses a refinement that in any subgame the principal induces the
continuation equilibrium that maximizes her payoffs. As in Strulovici (2017), when frictions disappear,
only efficient contracts arise in equilibrium.
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Neeman and Pavlov (2013) argue that for outcomes of a mechanism to be renegotiation-
proof under any renegotiation procedure there must be no Pareto improvements after the
mechanism has been played. That is, they take the view that if the mechanism designer
is agnostic about the specific renegotiation game that is played after the mechanism, the
outcome of the mechanism must be ex-post efficient to survive renegotiation under any
renegotiation procedure. The conceptual problem with this approach is that it permits all
Pareto-improving outcomes to be blocking, even if those outcomes are themselves subject
to renegotiation. In our approach, we require states to be renegotiation-proof only with
respect to states that are themselves renegotiation-proof. In contrast to Neeman and
Pavlov (2013), our approach allows for inefficient results.
Bester and Strausz (2001), Hörner and Samuelson (2011), Skreta (2006), and Skreta
(2015) limit renegotiation to finite procedures. This approach allows for interesting equi-
librium analysis but still leaves the principal with a considerable amount of commitment
power. In our frictionless setting, limiting the renegotiation to n opportunities would
allow the principal to implement the full commitment outcome. She could simply pass
on n− 1 opportunities and then propose the optimal contracts.
Evans and Reiche (2015) assume that after an initial mechanism is played, the principal
can offer a new mechanism and the agent may choose whether to retain the outcome of
the original mechanism or to participate in the new mechanism. They assume that there
is no friction in-between the mechanism proposals, as do we. After the new mechanism is
played, the renegotiation is over and there is no scope for further offers from the principal.
In this setting, the optimal mechanism from the point of view of the principal is easy
to implement if she proposes the null mechanism in the first round and the optimal
mechanism in the second round. What makes the analysis of Evans and Reiche (2015)
interesting is the fact that they allow a third party whose goals are not aligned with the
principal to propose the initial mechanism. This third party must then take into account
that the outcome of the mechanism may be subject to renegotiation.
Organization of the manuscript. The manuscript proceeds as follows. In Section
2, we introduce the general model and the commitment problem of the principal. In
Section 3, we derive the solution concept and the optimization problem of the principal.
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In Section 4, we apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous type space,
private values and non-linear contracts. In Section 5, we demonstrate how our solution
concept can be used to retrieve the Coase conjecture and the “gap – no gap” result. In
Section 6, we compare our solution concept to the solution concept used by Vartiainen
(2013). Section 7 concludes.
2. The Setup
Preferences. A principal (she) and an agent (he) want to implement a contract w from
a metric space of contractsW . If a contract w is implemented, the utility of the principal
amounts to v(w) where v : W → R is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
The utility of the agent is given by u(w, θ) where u : W × Θ → R is a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function and depends on the agent’s type θ. The agent’s type is
private information to the agent and is drawn from a metric space Θ. Endow Θ with
the Borel σ-algebra and denote by ∆(Θ) the set of all probability measures on the Borel
σ-algebra. Let d(·, ·) be a metric on Θ. We will denote by θ the -neighborhood of θ.
That is, the set of all θ′ ∈ Θ such that d(θ, θ′) < . The principal’s prior about the type
of the agent is characterized by µ0(·) ∈ ∆(Θ). The prior is common knowledge between
the agent and the principal. For µ ∈ ∆(Θ), we will denote by supp(µ) the support of µ.
That is, θ is in supp(µ) whenever µ(θ) > 0 for all  > 0. If no contract is implemented,
both parties receive the outside option contract denoted by w0 ∈ W .
Mechanisms. To elicit information from the agent and implement a contract the prin-
cipal uses a mechanism. A mechanism is a tuple M = (Z, w(·)) consisting of a metric
space of messages Z and a function w : Z → W . A mechanism works as follows. The
agent chooses a message z ∈ Z. When the message z is sent, w(z) generates a contract.13
Denote byM the set of all mechanisms. Denote by 1w the mechanism that generates w
for sure. That is, w(z) ≡ w for all z ∈ Z.
Example 1. To fix ideas, consider the following specification of the model that we will
analyze in Section 4. The principal is a seller that sells a good to the agent, the buyer. A
contract (q, p) ∈ W = R2+ specifies the quality q and the price p of the good. The seller
13Here it is assumed that communication is direct. For an analysis of contracting with renegotiation and
mediated communication, see for example Pollrich (2017) or Strausz (2012).
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incurs a cost of c(q) when producing a good of quality q . Her pay-off from a contract
(q, p) is p−c(q). A buyer of type θ ∈ Θ = [θ, θ¯] enjoys a utility of u(q, θ) when consuming
a good of quality q. His utility from a contract (p, q) is u(q, θ) − p. Higher types of
buyer enjoy a higher utility and a higher marginal utility from consuming the good. One
class of mechanism for this problem are direct mechanisms with Z = Θ, in which the
buyer directly reports his type and receives a contract according to his type. That is,
M = (Θ, (q(θ), p(θ))).
The problem. The problem for the principal is that she cannot commit to not renego-
tiating w(z) after the mechanism has been played. That is, after M is played and the
principal observes z, she will update her belief about the type of the agent to µ(· : z).
After observing z the principal may propose a new mechanism M ′ = (Z ′, w′(·)). The
agent can then decide whether he wants to play the new mechanism or whether he wants
to hold on to the initially generated contract w(z). In other words, w(z) is the new
outside-option contract of the agent. If the agent decides to play M ′, the principal again
observes the message, updates her belief, and may again renegotiate the new contract by
proposing a new mechanism. Overall, the principal is not able to commit to not rene-
gotiating any contract produced by any mechanism. Whenever a mechanism is played,
the principal may propose a new mechanism and the agent may decide to either hold on
to his current contract or to participate in the new mechanism. Thus, we are concerned
with the question of what mechanisms will not be renegotiated at the ex-post stage.
To be more precise, consider the following negotiation. At each stage t = 1, 2, .. the
principal proposes a mechanism Mt = (Zt, wt(·)) ∈ M. The agent chooses a message
zt ∈ Zt or decides to hold on to the contract wt−1 that was generated by the mechanism
Mt−1 in stage t − 1. The contract wt−1 is implemented if in stage t the principal offers
Mt = 1wt−1 . Denote a history before the principal moves in round t by
hpt = {(M1, z1, w1), (M2, z2, w2), . . . , (Mt−1, zt−1, wt−1)} .
A history realized before the agent moves is
hat = {(M1), (M2, z1, w1), . . . , (Mt, zt−1, wt−1)} .
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In round 1 there is no relevant history for the principal, so hp1 = ∅. Let Hat be the
set of all histories for the agent at round t and let Hpt be the set of all histories for the
principal.14
Strategies and beliefs. Before we discuss the solution concept it is useful to define
strategies and beliefs of the principal and the agent.
A mechanism selection strategy σp of the principal prescribes in each round t the
mechanism Mt that the principal will choose conditional on the history hpt . That is, σp
is a sequence of maps
σpt : Hpt →M.
Endow Zt with the Borel σ-algebra and denote by ∆(Zt) the set of all probability
measures on the Borel σ−algebra. A behavior strategy σat of an agent of type θ prescribes
in each round t a probability distribution over messages in Zt conditional of the history
hat . That is, σa is a sequence of maps
σat : Hat ×Θ→ ∆ (Zt ∪ {wt−1}) .
The belief system of the principal is a sequence {µ0, µ1, . . .} where µt−1 ∈ ∆(Θ) are the
beliefs held after a history hpt .15
States and outcome function. There are two additional concepts that are useful to
define before we turn to the solution concept. We define the state of the negotiation as the
chosen contract of the agent and the resulting belief of the principal. That is, we call Ct =
(wt−1(z), µt−1(· : z)) the state of the negotiation after mechanism Mt−1 = (Zt−1, wt−1(·))
and define Γ = W ×∆(Θ) as the set of all possible states. In particular, every history ht
leads to a state that was generated by the sequence of mechanisms and choices of the agent
that lead to this history. That is, for a given ht, Cht = (wt−1, µt−1). For a given mechanism
Mt = (Zt, wt(·)) and a given history ht we will denote by f(Mt, σa(hat )) ⊂ Γ the set of
states generated by this mechanism. That is, a state C = (w, µ) is in f(Mt, σat (hat )) if –
given the strategy σa of the agent – there exists a message z ∈ Z that is chosen by some
14We will drop the superscript from hp and ha whenever we refer to both or whenever it is unambiguous
whose history is used.
15We slightly abuse notation as we suppress that different histories in period t might lead to a different
posterior.
10
type of the agent with positive probability such that wt(z) = w and µt(· : z) = µ. Each
mechanism selection strategy of the principal together with the strategy of the agent
induces a set of possible states Ω =
⋃
ht∈H f(σ
p
t (ht), σ
a
t (h
a
t )) ⊂ Γ.
3. Solution Concept: Renegotiation Proof States
In this section we closely follow Gretschko andWambach (2016) and identify renegotiation-
proof states. That is, states Ct = (wt−1, µt−1), such that the principal will not renegotiate
wt−1. We extend the definitions in Gretschko and Wambach (2016) by considering ar-
bitrary type spaces and not merely discrete ones. In Section 6, we demonstrate that
renegotiation-proof states arise from mechanism selection strategies that are consistent
and optimal in the sense of Vartiainen (2013). We focus on renegotiation-proof states
Ct = (wt−1, µt−1) rather then renegotiation-proof contracts wt−1, as whether the principal
will want to renegotiate will crucially depend on her belief.
We start by observing that every subgame after some history ht can be represented
by a single stage mechanism that the principal will not renegotiate. That is, if after
history ht the subsequent play of the agent and the principal eventually induce a type
conditioned lottery over states and posterior beliefs, then there is a mechanism and
a strategy of the agent that induces the same type dependent lotteries over states and
posterior beliefs. In any subgame after ht the strategy of the principal and the strategy of
the agent induces a distribution over potential states in
⋃
{hs∈H:s≥t,ht⊂hs} f(σ
p(hs), σ
a(hs)).
Instead of playing out the game according to those histories, the principal can offer a
mechanism M = (Z, w(·)) such that w[Z] includes all contracts that are part of the
states in
⋃
{hs∈H:s≥t,ht⊂hs} f(σ
p(hs), σ
a(hs)) and the agent mixes between messages z ∈ Z
in a way that induces the same probability distribution over states and posterior beliefs as
playing out the histories would. Thus, we will focus on single-stage mechanisms after each
history. The problem then boils down to identify states after a single-stage mechanism
that the principal would not like to renegotiate given the strategy of the agent. We will
call such states renegotiation-proof states, denote the set of renegotiation-proof states by
Ω and derive its properties in the following.
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Agent’s incentives. Suppose a history ht that the current state of negotiation is Ct =
(wt−1, µt−1) and the principal offers a mechanism Mt = (Zt, (wt(·)) such that if the agent
chooses z∈ Z t optimally every choice leads to a renegotiation-proof state. That is, the
negotiation will be over after the agent chooses a message z and the contract wt(z) is
generated. Then the agent indeed should choose optimally in the single-stage mechanism.
The optimal choice of the agent can be characterized as follows.
Lemma 1 (Agent’s strategy). In a single-stage mechanism an agent with type θ will
choose z ∈ Zt (possibly mixing between messages) such that u(wt(z), θ) ≥ u(wt(z′), θ)
for all z′ ∈ Zt. In particular, u(wt(z), θ) > u(wt(z′), θ) for all z′ ∈ Zt/ {z} implies that
σa(ht, θ) [A] = 1 for all σa(ht, θ)-measurable A ⊂ Zt such that z ∈ A.
Denote by νMt ∈ ∆(Zt) the measure on Zt that is induced by the strategy σa(ht, θ) of
the agent and the belief of the principal µt−1 after history ht. That is, for all A in the
Borel σ-algebra on Zt it must hold νMt(A) =
∫
Θ
σa(ht, θ) [A] dµt−1.
Optimal play of the agent is then understood in the following sense. The agent will
choose the message z from the message space that gives him the highest payoff. Whenever
more than one message gives the agent the highest possible payoffs, the agent may mix
between those messages. Note that the same message may be optimal for more than one
type of the agent. Thus, optimal play of the agent does not need to be fully revealing.
In fact, we will show below that the optimal mechanism from the point of view of the
principal is not fully revealing the type of the agent.
Next, we define which states can be induced by a mechanism in which the agent chooses
optimally. That is, we define conditions on a set of states {C(z) = (w(z), µ(·, z)) : z ∈ Z}
such that there exists a mechanismM = (Z, w(·)) that, if played optimally starting at ht,
generates this set of states. This set of states will then be called feasible. Those conditions
encompass all possibilities of optimal play of the agent. Thus, they are independent from
ht other than through the induced state Cht . This implies that the definition of feasibility
is with respect to Ct rather then ht. Those conditions are necessary for states to be
renegotiation-proof.
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Definition 1 (Feasibility). Let Z be a metric space. We call a set of states
{C(z) = (w(z), µ(·, z)) : z ∈ Z}
feasible for the agent starting from Cht = (wt−1, µt−1) if the following conditions are
satisfied.
(i) (Individual rationality) For all θ ∈ supp(µ) there exists a z ∈ Z such that
u(w(z), θ) ≥ u(wt−1, θ).
(ii) (Incentive compatibility) For any θ ∈ supp(µ), if there exists a z and a z′ in Z
such that u(w(z), θ) > u(w(z′), θ) then θ /∈ supp(µt−1(· : z′)).
(iii) (Bayesian consistency) For the probability measure ν ∈ ∆(Z) generated from a
optimal strategy of the agent and the initial belief µt−1 it holds that∫
Z
µ(θ : z)dν = µt−1(θ).
We define by IC(C) : Γ→ 2Γ the mapping from some C to all feasible states starting from
C. That is, {C(z) : z ∈ Z} is an element of IC(C) if {C(z) : z ∈ Z} satisfies conditions
(i) to (iii).
For {C(z) : z ∈ Z} to be states that can be generated by a mechanism starting from
Cht it is necessary that the agent is weakly better off compared to the initial situation in
state Cht (requirement (i)). The principal takes the optimal behavior into account when
updating her belief (requirement (ii)). From the ex-ante point of view of the principal
optimal play of the agent and the initial belief µt−1 induce a probability distribution ν over
the set of messages Z. This should be consistent with Bayesian updating (requirement
(iii)).
The conditions follow endogenously from the fact that the agent will choose an improve-
ment if he beliefs that the contract is terminal. That is, feasible states were derived under
the assumption that the agent does not expect further negotiations and thus chooses (pos-
sibly mixing) the optimal contract from his point of view. Optimal play by the agent,
however, will only be induced if the principal will not renegotiate the proposed mecha-
nism for any feasible state. Thus, we turn our attention to states in which the principal
would not renegotiate.
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Principal’s strategy. As argued above, for our solution concept, it is sufficient to focus
on strategies of the principal that prescribe her to offer a single-stage mechanism that
results only in renegotiation-proof states if played optimally by the agent, and end the
negotiation afterwards. Let Ω define the set of renegotiation-proof states that we yet
have to define. Thus, we focus on strategies of the principal such that if Cht /∈ Ω,
then σp(ht) = (Z,w(·)) such that {C(z) = (w(z), µt−1(· : z)) : z ∈ Z} ∈ IC(Cht) and
{C(z) = (w(z), µt−1(· : z)) : z ∈ Z} ⊂ Ω. If Cht ∈ Ω, then σp(ht) = 1wt−1 .
We now turn our attention to the definition of Ω, the set of renegotiation-proof states.
To characterize renegotiation-proof states, it is convenient to introduce some notation
on which feasible states make the principal weakly better off when proposing a new
mechanism in history ht with state Cht . That is, we define conditions on a given set of
feasible states
{C(z) = (w(z), µt−1(·, z)) : z ∈ Z} ∈ IC(Cht)
such that there exists a mechanism M = (Z, w(·)) that, if played optimally by the agent,
generates this set of states and makes the principal weakly better off.
Definition 2. Let Z be a metric space. A feasible set of states
{C(z) = (w(z), µ(·, z)) : z ∈ Z} ∈ IC(Cht)
makes the principal weakly better off starting from Cht = (wt−1, µt−1) if the following
condition is satisfied.
(1) v(wt−1) ≤
∫
Z
v(w(z))dν.
With ν ∈ ∆(Z) denoting the probability measure generated from a optimal strategy of
the agent and the initial belief µt−1 (Lemma 1).
We define by X(C) : Γ→ 2Γ the mapping from some C to all feasible states that make
the principal better of starting from C. That is, {C(z) : z ∈ Z} is an element of X(C) if
{C(z) : z ∈ Z} ∈ IC(C) and satisfies inequality (1).
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We are now in the position to define renegotiation-proof states. Renegotiation-proof
states are not identified one-by-one but simultaneously as a set. The key insight is
that whether a state is renegotiation-proof or not will crucially depend on whether it
can be improved by other feasible renegotiation-proof states. That is, renegotiation-
proof states cannot be improved by other renegotiation-proof states. States that are
not renegotiation-proof, can be improved by feasible renegotiation-proof states. Thus,
the set of renegotiation-proof states should have two properties. First, independent of
the current state of the negotiation it should be feasible to reach renegotiation-proof
states. This is to ensure that our solution concept is well defined. Second, whenever the
negotiation has reached a renegotiation-proof state, the principal should not be better off
by renegotiating to another renegotiation-proof state. This is to ensure that the principal
will end the negotiation after reaching a renegotiation proof state. The following definition
formalizes these conditions.
Definition 3 (Renegotiation proofness). Ω ⊂ Γ is a set of renegotiation-proof states if
the following holds true.
(i) (External consistency) If C is not in Ω, there exists {C(z) : z ∈ Z} ∈ X(C) such
that {C(z) : z ∈ Z} ⊂ Ω. That is, there is {C(z) : z ∈ Z} ∈ IC(C) that makes
the principal better off and is renegotiation proof.
(ii) (Internal consistency) For all C = (w, µ) in Ω and for all {C(z) : z ∈ Z} ∈ IC(C)
such that {C(z) : z ∈ Z} ⊂ Ω it holds that v(w) ≥ ∫Z v(w(z))dν. That is, for
all {C(z) : z ∈ Z} ∈ X(C) such that {C(z) : z ∈ Z} ⊂ Ω it holds that v(w) =∫
Z v(w(z))dν.
It is crucial to understand that the restrictions we place on the set of renegotiation-
proof states reflect sequential rationality. Thus, the solution concept is consistent with
standard solution concepts. Indeed, in a slightly simpler setting, Gretschko and Wambach
(2016) show that for every set of renegotiation-proof states there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the mechanism design game that implements the optimal state in the set.
Thus, renegotiation-proofness can be seen as a refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
To see how renegotiation-proofness implies sequential rationality, suppose the principal
– instead of implementing the contract in a renegotiation-proof state – deviates and
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proposes a new mechanismM . By external consistency, the states resulting from the new
mechanism can be further improved by renegotiation-proof states. Thus, the principal
benefits from proposing a new mechanism M ′ that leads to renegotiation-proof states. It
follows from internal consistency that proposing M could not have been profitable in the
first place.
The same argument applies to any finite deviation by the principal. This is due to the
fact that starting from some state C, any finite sequence of proposed mechanisms can
be interpreted as just one feasible mechanism. Following the same argument as above,
deviation to this mechanism cannot be profitable. In terms of infinite long deviations,
Gretschko and Wambach (2016) show that, with the appropriate assumptions regarding
the payoffs of infinite terminal histories, every infinite deviation can be improved by
a finite one. In particular, this implies incentive compatibility of the mechanisms for
the agent as if the principal follows the proposed selection strategy after any history
the mechanisms will not be redesigned ex-post and the agent can play the mechanism
optimally. Four remarks are in order.
Remark 1. Our solution concept is equivalent to the solution concept introduced by
Vartiainen (2013). We demonstrate this equivalence in Section 6. The main advantage of
the introduced concept is that it allows us to dispense with the details of the particular
mechanism selection strategy of the principal and directly characterize renegotiation-
proof states. Much like the revelation principle, this provides a tool to analyze contracting
problems with limited commitment which is both effective and easy to use. We contrast
the cutting power of our concept as compared with Vartiainen (2013) in Section 5 where
we analyze the Coase conjecture and rederive the “gap-no-gap” result.
Remark 2. The key idea is that states that are not renegotiation proof but can be im-
proved by renegotiation-proof states shall not block the principal’s mechanism choice.
That is, the principal might not renegotiate a contract even if there is an other mech-
anism that would make the principal strictly better off. This implies that negotiation
can stop even if there is room for Pareto improvement. In particular, our solution con-
cept does not ad-hoc rule out inefficiencies. In fact, as we will show below, the optimal
mechanism from the point of view of the principal will be inefficient.
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Remark 3. Our concept is related to the concept of von Neumann-Morgenstern stability
(von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)). There are two main differences. The first one
is technical: von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) define their concept as a dominance
relation between elements of a set. In our context, the dominance relation is defined
between elements of a set (the states) and sets of elements of a set (sets of states).
The second is that in our concept internal consistency implies that if one of the players
(the principal) is not made strictly better off by proposing a new mechanism that leads
to renegotiation-proof states, she can decide not to propose a new mechanism. Von
Neumann and Morgenstern’s concept in our context would require that as long as one
of the parties (i.e. principal and agent) can be made better off without making the
other party strictly worse off the principal should propose a new mechanism. However,
we consider the case where the principal has all the bargaining power. Thus, if she is
indifferent between proposing a new mechanism and sticking to the current contract,
there is no explicit need for the principal to propose a new mechanism. She might be
better off by not proposing a new mechanism. Indeed, as we will show below, the optimal
renegotiation-proof mechanism will result in inefficiencies. Thus, the mechanism could
be improved further from the point of view of the agent, but not the principal.
Remark 4. The definition of the set of renegotiation-proof states is related to the concept
of weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium as proposed by Farrell and Maskin (1989) An
equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game is called weakly renegotiation proof if equilib-
rium payoffs of different subgames cannot be strictly Pareto ranked. Following a similar
logic, internal consistency ensures that payoffs of different feasible states that are in Ω
cannot make the principal strictly better off without leaving the agent strictly worse off.
We are now in the position to state the principal’s optimization problem.
Lemma 2 (Principal’s problem). Denote by C0 = (w0, µ0) the initial contract-belief pair
and by Ω sets of renegotiation-proof states. The principal’s optimization problem can be
17
written as
max
Ω,{C(z)}
∫
Z
v(w(z))dν
s.t. {C(z) = (w(z), µ0(· : z)) : z ∈ Z} ∈ X(C0)
{C(z) = (w(z), µ0(· : z)) : z ∈ Z} ⊂ Ω.
Some useful results. One of the main advantages of our solution concept is that we can
abstract from the mechanism selection strategy of the principal and simply construct sets
Ω of renegotiation-proof states. That is, we need to construct sets Ω that are internally
and externally consistent. Before we turn our attention to specific applications of the
solution concept, we will state the following two results that facilitate the construction
of renegotiation-proof Ω.
Lemma 3. If X(C) = {C} , then C is in any renegotiation-proof Ω which satisfies the
conditions of Definition 3.
Proof. Follows directly from external consistency. If {C} is the only element of X(C),
then C must be in any Ω. 
In particular, Lemma 3 implies that any Pareto-efficient allocation must be in Ω.
Lemma 4. Let Ω satisfy the conditions of Definition 3. For any C = (w, µ) if there
exists {C ′ = (w′, µ)} in X(C) such that v(w′) > v(w), then C is not in Ω.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary there exist C ∈ Ω and a C ′ = (w′, µ) such that {C ′} ∈
X(C) and v(w′) > v(w). In this case, internal consistency implies that C ′ is not
in Ω. External consistency implies that there exists {C(z) : z ∈ Z} ∈ X(C ′) with
{C(z) : z ∈ Z} ⊂ Ω. This implies that ∫Z v(w(z))dν ≥ v(w′). As {C(z) : z ∈ Z} is
feasible starting from C ′, {C(z) : z ∈ Z} is also feasible starting from C. Together with∫
Z v(w(z))dν ≥ v(w′) > v(w) this violates internal consistency and it follows that neither
C /∈ Ω nor Ω is a set of renegotiation-proof states. 
Lemma 4 has an intuitive interpretation. For any potential state, if there exists a
single contract that would be accepted by the agent independent of his type and makes
the principal strictly better off, then the initial state cannot be renegotiation-proof. If this
were the case, the principal could simply offer a mechanism in which this contract could
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be implemented for any message from the agent. Such a mechanism would be played
truthfully by the agent since it does not reveal any additional information and would
make the principal strictly better off. Thus, the contract resulting from the original state
would be renegotiated.
4. Design of non-linear contracts with limited commitment
We now turn to the main application of our solution concept. We will proceed as
follows. Firstly, we will set up the model. Secondly, we will introduce applications of
the model. Thirdly, we will state the main result, briefly describe the main intuition and
give an outline of the proof. Fourthly, we will introduce a simple example to illustrate
the main result. Finally, we will provide a proof of the main result.
Set up. Consider a principal who wants to implement a two-dimensional contract w =
(p, q) with q ∈ R+ and p ∈ R. If a contract (p, q) is implemented, the utility of the
principal is given by
v(w) = p− c(q).
Denote by cq(·) the derivative of c(·) with respect to q and by cqq(·) the second derivative
of c(·) with respect to q. Assume that cq(·) > 0 and cqq(·) > 0.
The utility of the agent is given by
u¯(w, θ) = u(q, θ)− p.
The type θ of the agent is taken from Θ =
[
θ, θ¯
]
. Denote by uq the derivative of u with
respect to q and by uqq the second derivative of u with respect to q. Similarly, denote by
uθ the derivative of u with respect to θ and by uqθ the cross-derivative of u with respect
to q and θ. Assume that uq > 0 and uqq ≤ 0 and that u satisfies single crossing. That is,
uθ > 0 and uqθ > 0, a larger type receives larger utility and larger marginal utility from
a given q. The principal’s prior about the agent’s type is given by µ0 ∈ ∆(Θ). Assume
that supp(µ0) = Θ.16 The initial contract w0 is (0, 0).
Applications. The initial model can be interpreted to fit, but is not limited to, the
following applications.
16In particular, full support of µ0 on Θ =
[
θ, θ¯
]
rules out discrete distributions.
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(1) Selling when price and quality matter. The principal is a seller that sells a good
to the agent, the buyer. The contract (q, p) specifies the quality q and the price
p of the good. The seller incurs a cost of c(q) when producing a good of quality
q. A buyer of type θ enjoys a utility of u(q, θ) when consuming a good of quality
q. Higher types of buyer enjoy a higher utility and a higher marginal utility from
consuming the good.
(2) Procurement. The principal is a buyer who procures a good from the agent, the
seller. The contract (p, q) specifies the quantity q and the price −p of the good.
The buyer derives a utility of −c(q) when procuring a quantity q of the good. A
seller of type θ incurs a cost of −u(q, θ) when producing a quantity q of the good.
Higher types of seller enjoy a lower cost of production and a lower marginal cost
of production.
(3) Franchising. The principal is a manufacturer who produces a quantity q of a good
at cost c(q) and sells the good to a retailer, the agent, at price p. The retailer
faces a demand of D(t, θ) for the good with t denoting the resale price and θ the
demand shock that is private knowledge to the retailer. Higher θ imply a higher
demand and a higher marginal demand. The profit for the retailer from selling
the good is u(q, θ) = tD(t, θ).
(4) Labor contracts. The principal is a potential employer and the agent is a worker.
The contract (p, q) specifies the effort q of the agent and his wage −p. The
principal derives a utility of −c(q) from the effort of the agent. An agent with
productivity θ incurs a cost of effort of −u(q, θ). Higher types of agent enjoy a
lower cost of effort and a lower marginal cost of effort.
In what follows we will adopt the “selling when price and quality matter ” interpretation
of the model and call q the quality of the good and p the price.
Useful properties of the model. Before we turn our attention to the main result, we
first state some useful definitions for and properties of the considered model. Denote by
q∗(θ) the efficient quality for a given type θ. The efficient quality is implicitly given by
(2) −vq(q∗(θ)) = uq(q∗(θ), θ).
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Given the assumptions we made about v and u, q∗(θ) is unique and satisfies
q∗θ(θ) =
uqθ(q
∗(θ), θ)
vqq(q∗(θ))− uqq(q∗(θ), θ) > 0.
Definition 4. Define µθ as the probability measure that puts probability 1 on type θ.
That is, for all measurable sets A, µθ(A) = 1 whenever θ ∈ A and µθ(A) = 0 otherwise.
We will call an state
(1) C = ((p, q), µθ) a separating state. Efficient and separating states are denoted by
C = ((p, q∗(θ), µθ),
(2) C = ((p, q), µ) a pooling state if it holds µ0(supp(µ)) > 0. With µ0 being the
initial belief of the principal.
Lemma 5. If the principal can commit to any mechanism, there exists a direct, individ-
ually rational and incentive compatible mechanism that implements the efficient quality.
That is, there exists a price function p(θ) such that for all types θ,
u(q∗(θ), θ)− p(θ) ≥ u(q∗(θˆ), θ)− p(θˆ)
for all θˆ ∈ Θ. This holds true for all p(θ) such that
(3) pθ(θ) = uq(q∗(θ), θ)q∗(θ) > 0.
Proof. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) Theorem 7.3 for a proof. 
Lemma 6. If every type obtains his efficient quality and the prices satisfy (3), then the
principal is indifferent between all contracts; she obtains the same profit from all types.
That is, v(q∗(θ))− p(θ) = k for some constant k.
Proof. This is a consequence of pθ(θ)−vq(q∗(θ))q∗θ(θ) = (uqq∗(θ), θ)−vq(q∗(θ)))q∗θ(θ) = 0.
Due to equation (2) and equation (3). 
The main result. Our main result is that the optimal set of states {C(z)}z∈N that will
not be renegotiated by the seller has the following properties. Firstly, all states that are
achieved with positive probability are pooling states. Secondly, for each of these pooling
states the lowest type choosing this contract obtains his efficient quality; all other types
receive an inefficient quality.
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Theorem 1. The profit maximizing set of renegotiation-proof states {C(z)}z∈ N is count-
ably infinite and has the following properties
(1) (Pooling) All C(z) = ((p, q), µ) are pooling states.
(2) (No distortion at the bottom) C(z) = ((pz, q∗(θz)), µ) with θz = min(supp(µ)).
The maximization problem of the principal becomes:17
(4)
max
{θz}z∈N
∑
z∈N
(pz − v(q∗(θz))µ0([θz, θz+1])
s.t. θz+1 > θz, θ0 = θ, and θz < θ¯
u(q∗(θz+1), θz+1)− pz+1 = u(q∗(θz), θz+1)− pz.
One remark is in order with respect to the solution of the maximization problem of the
principal.
Remark 5. To solve the maximization problem of the principal we can use the incen-
tive constraints (q∗(θz+1), θz+1) − pz+1 = u(q∗(θz), θz+1) − pz to back out the optimal
prices. That is, setting p0 = θ and solving recursively yields pk =
∑k
t=1 u(q
∗(θt), θt) −
u(q∗(θt−1), θt) + θ. The optimization problem of the principal can be rewritten to give
(5)
max
{θz}z∈N
∑
z∈N
[(
z∑
t=1
u(q∗(θt), θt)− u(q∗(θt−1), θt) + θ
)
− v(q∗(θz))µ0([θz, θz+1])
]
s.t. θz+1 > θz, θ0 = θ, and θz < θ¯
This problem can then be approximated numerically for finite z. We demonstrate this
approach in the example below.
We will now provide an intuition for the result and an outline of the proof. Moreover,
we will provide a simple example that illustrates the results and contrasts them with
models with full commitment.
Intuition and outline for the proof of the main result. To gain some intuition for
our main result, observe that by Lemma 3 efficient and separating states must be in any
set of renegotiation-proof states. Thus, only states that cannot be strictly improved by a
set of efficient and separating states can be in any set of renegotiation-proof states. The
17A solution to this problem exists, as a solution to the auxiliary problem with θz+1 ≥ θz and θz ≤ θ¯
exists and Lemma 11 shows that it necessarily is on the interior.
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only states that cannot be improved by a set of efficient and separating states are pooling
states with a connected support in which one of the types in the pool receives his efficient
quality. This is due to the fact that the type that received his efficient quality in the
pooling state, also receives his efficient quality in a feasible set of efficient and separating
states. Thus, by Lemma 6, if the principal were to propose a new mechanism that led to
efficient and separating states, she would make the same profit as with the pooling state.
The profit maximizing states among such pooling states is then a countably infinite set of
pooling states with the lowest type in the pool receiving his efficient quality. This stems
from the fact that separation of types is only possible with efficient states. However,
efficient and separating states imply a higher information rent than, say, two pooling
states would. Moreover, if the principal offers the efficient quality to the lowest type in
the pool, she reduces the information rent of the higher types that are not in the pool. The
proof of Theorem 1 proceeds by a series of lemmata that reflect the intuition given above.
The outline is instructive for the understanding of the structure of renegotiation-proof
sets.
Firstly, we show that for any state C there exists a set of efficient and separating states
that are feasible and make the principal weakly better off (Lemma 7). Secondly, we
demonstrate that the following states cannot be part of any renegotiation-proof Ω:
(1) Inefficient and separating states, that is, C = ((p, q), µθ) such that q 6= q∗(θ)
(Lemma 8).
(2) States with a belief of the principal whose support has a gap, that is, C =
((p, q), µ) such that supp(µ) is not connected (Lemma 9).
(3) States with a quality that is efficient for a type that is not in the support of the
belief of the principal, that is, C = ((p, q), µ) such that q = q∗(θ) but θ /∈ supp(µ)
(Lemma 10).
Thus, every set of renegotiation-proof states must consist of a combination of efficient
and separating states and pooling states with a connected support such that one of the
types in the pool receives his efficient quality.
Thirdly, we prove that the profit maximizing set of states {C(z)} among the states
with a connected support of µ(z) and an efficient quality for one type in supp(µ(z))
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takes the form described in Theorem 1. That is, the set is countably infinite, µ(z) is not
degenerate for every C(z), and the lowest type in support of µ(z) receives his efficient
quality (Lemma 11). The proof of Lemma 11 proceeds along five steps.
(1) We show that in the set of optimal states higher types receive higher quality.
(2) We demonstrate that the principal optimally makes a higher profit from the higher
agent types.
(3) We argue that efficient and separating states are not optimal for the principal.
This is due to the fact that if the principal offers the efficient quality to a connected
subset of types while satisfying the incentive compatibility constraints, she will not
obtain additional rent from higher types. Those types receive a high information
rent. In this case, the principal can reduce the information rent by offering pooling
contracts.
(4) We show that the lowest type in a pooling and connected state will receive his
optimal quality in the profit-maximizing set of states. If in the pooling state
the quality is optimal for some intermediate type, the quality for the lower types
is distorted in the wrong direction. That is, they receive too much quality. In
this case, the seller prefers to give some types a lower quality which reduces the
information rent to higher types. The best way to achieve this is to give the
lowest type in the pool the efficient quality, such that the quality for all the types
is distorted in the right direction.
(5) We demonstrate that the set of profit-maximizing states must be countably infi-
nite. To see this, let us suppose to the contrary that the number of states is finite.
In this case, there exists an state that contains all types above some θ. It follows
that the principal is better off if she splits this pool into two pools: one where she
obtains the same profit as before and that contains the lower types of agent and
a second one where she obtains a higher profit and that is chosen by the higher
types of agent.
Fourthly, we demonstrate that the resulting set is internally and externally consistent
and thus renegotiation-proof (Lemma 12).
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Overall, we construct the optimal set of renegotiation-proof contracts from the point
of view of the principal starting from (w0, µ0). Of course, there exist other sets of
renegotiation-proof contracts that are internally and externally consistent and could be
implemented by a principal with a consistent mechanism selection strategy. For example,
if the initial contract w0 is efficient for some type θ ∈ [θ, θ¯] the set including all efficient
and separating states and the initial state (w0, µ0) can be supported as renegotiation
proof. Even though it would not be the optimal set of contracts. Moreover, Lemma 12
implies any set of pooling states such that one of types in the support of µz receives his
efficient quality can be sustained as renegotiation proof. Even the set that divides the
optimal pools from Theorem 1 even further. Again, such a set of renegotiation-proof
states would not be optimal from the point of view of the principal at (w0, µ0).
The construction also illustrates how internal and external consistency work together
to achieve recursively renegotiation-proof states. Suppose the principal decides to split
one of the pools [θz, θz+1) further by renegotiating and offering for example one additional
contract that splits the pool in [θz, θ) and (θ, θz+1]. Such a split can be profitable given
our construction. However, from each of the new pools the only feasible renegotiation-
proof states are efficient and separating states for all of the types in the pools. Those
states would have been also feasible in the first place. However, they make the principal
exactly indifferent between pooling the types in [θz, θz+1) or offering efficient contracts.
Before we turn our attention to the proof of Theorem 1, we shall illustrate our results
by means of an example.
Illustration of the results by means of an example. Let v(p, q) = p − 1/2q2 and
u(p, q, θ) = θq − p. Let Θ = [1, 2] and µ0 the uniform measure on [1, 2]. In this case the
efficient quality for each type is given by q∗(θ) = θ. We compare four different scenarios.
(i) First best. If the principal is able to observe the agent’s type, the principal can extract
all the surplus from the agent. She will offer contract (p, q) = (θ2, θ) to an agent of type
θ and thereby achieve the first-best allocation from her point of view. The overall profit
of the principal is then given by ∫ 2
1
1
2
θ2 dθ =
7
6
.
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(ii) Efficient contracting. If the principal cannot observe the agent’s type, she is still able
to implement the efficient quality levels. Efficient quality levels are achieved by offering
a menu of contracts (p, q) = (0.5(1 + q2), q) for q ∈ [1, 2]. In this case, for each type θ of
the agent it is optimal to choose (0.5(1 + θ2), θ) so that every type of agent obtains his
efficient quality. Moreover, the agent with the type θ = 1 obtains a rent of 0, every other
type of agent receives a positive rent. The principal obtains the same profit from every
type of agent which amounts to
1
2
(
1 + θ2
)− 1
2
θ2 =
1
2
.
(iii) Second best – with commitment. If the principal cannot observe the agent’s type and
can fully commit, she can implement distorting contracts to maximize her own profit. The
optimal contract for each type θ is then given by (p, q) = (θ2 − 1, 2(θ − 1)). In this case,
the agent of type θ = 2 obtains a contract with his efficient quality. Every other type of
agent θ ∈ [1, 2) obtains a contract with a quality that is lower than his efficient one. The
result is often called “no distortion at the top”. The second-best state can be achieved by
offering a menu of contracts (p(q), q) = (q2/4 + q, q). The profit of the principal is given
by
∫ 2
1
θ2 − 1− 2(θ − 1)2 dθ = 2
3
.
(iv) Third best – without commitment. Theorem 1 provides us with a structure of the set
of renegotiation-proof states. Any increasing sequence θz with contracts (pz, q∗(θz)) such
that u(q∗(θz+1), θz+1)−pz+1 = u(q∗(θz), θz+1)−pz constitutes a set of renegotiation-proof
states. Thus, we merely have to solve for the optimal such sequence. Using the incentive
compatibility constraints in equation (4), that is, θ2z+1 − pz+1 = θz+1θz − pz, and setting
p0 = 1, the program in Theorem 1 can be rewritten to give
max 1 +
∑
z∈N
(
(2− θz+1) θz+1 − 1
2
θ2z
)
(θz+1 − θz)
s.t. θz+1 > θz, θ0 = 1, and θz < 2
.
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Figure 1. The comparison of the efficient quality levels (blue line) with
the quality levels with the second-best solution with commitment (green
line) and the third-best solution without commitment (red line).
We approximated this program for z ∈ {0, . . . , 6} numerically.18 With six contracts
the optimal pooling of types is given by
[θ0, θ1] = [1, 1.63], (p0, q0) = (1, 1), u(p0, q0, θ0) = 0
[θ1, θ2] = [1.63, 1.87], (p1, q1) = (2.03, 1.63), u(p1, q1, θ1) = 0.63
[θ2, θ3] = [1.87, 1.95], (p2, q2) = (2.48, 1.87), u(p2, q2, θ2) = 1.012
[θ3, θ4] = [1.95, 1.98], (p3, q3) = (2.63, 1.98), u(p3, q3, θ3) = 1.17
[θ4, θ5] = [1.98, 1.99], (p4, q4) = (2.69, 1.98), u(p4, q4, θ4) = 1.23
[θ5, θ6] = [1.99, 2], (p5, q5) = (2.71, 1.99), u(p5, q5, θ6) = 1.25.
The profit of the principal is given by
0.5773.
The overview of the results is depicted in Figure 1.
To get an idea for how the optimization changes we additionally summarized the re-
sults of the simulations for z ∈ {0, 1}, . . . , z ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} in Table 1. As will be
18Adding z=7 and thereby a seventh contract increased the profit of the principal only in the order of
10−5.
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max z θ1 θ1 θ3 θ4 Profit
2 1.67 0.5740
3 1.64 1.88 0.5771
4 1.63 1.87 1.96 0.5773
5 1.63 1.87 1.95 1.98 0.5773
Table 1. Development of pooling of types for numerical solutions with
maximum number of pools from 2 to 5.
corroborated by Lemma 11 the principal ideally splits pools at the top of the type space
if she gains an additional degree of freedom. This is consequence of the fact that splitting
pools at the bottom of the type space would distort incentives for higher types in an
unfavorable way.
Proof of the main result. We will now turn our attention to the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 7. For any state C = ((p, q), µ) there exists a set of efficient and separating states
{C(z)} which is feasible and makes the principal weakly better off. That is, {C(z)} ∈
X(C).
Proof. The proof is relegated to the appendix. 
Lemma 8. If θ 6= θ′, a separating C = ((p, q∗(θ), µθ′) cannot be an element of any set of
renegotiation-proof states Ω.
Proof. Starting from C = ((p, q∗(θ), µθ′), there exists a feasible state C¯ = ((p¯, q∗(θ′)), µθ′)
that makes the principal strictly better off. Lemma 4 implies the result. 
In what follows, we will call states such that supp(µ) is non-degenerated, pooling states.
Lemma 9. If supp(µ) is not connected, C = ((p, q), µ) cannot be an element of any set
of renegotiation-proof states Ω.
Proof. That supp(µ) is not connected implies that there exist θ′ and θ′′ in supp(µ) with
θ′′ > θ′ such that µ((θ′, θ′′)) = 0. Suppose that q = q∗(θˆ) for some θˆ ≤ θ′.19 We will show
that there exists a feasible set of efficient and separating states that make the principal
strictly better off. Consider the following menu of contracts {(p(θ), q∗(θ)) : θ ∈ supp(µ)}
with pθ = uqq∗θ . For θ ≤ θ′ set p(θˆ) = p. For θ ≥ θ′′ set p(θ′′) = p(θ′) + u(q∗(θ′′), θ′′) −
19The case θˆ > θ′ works analogously.
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u(q∗(θ′), θ′′). From Lemma 5 it follows that each type of agent is better off with the con-
tract with his efficient quality. That is, an agent of type θ is better off with (p(θ), q∗(θ)).
The seller is strictly better off, since she makes the same profit from all types θ ≤ θ′ and
strictly more profit from types θ ≥ θ′′. This is a consequence of the efficiency of q∗(θ′′)
and
[p(θ′′)− v(q∗(θ′′))]− [p(θ′)− v(q∗(θ′))] =
[u(q∗(θ′′), θ′′)− v(q∗(θ′′))]− [u(q∗(θ′), θ′′)− v(q∗(θ′))] > 0.
Thus, we constructed a feasible set of efficient and separating states that make the prin-
cipal strictly better off. As, due to Lemma 7, all efficient and separating states are in
every set of renegotiation-proof states, the initial state C could not have been part of any
set of renegotiation-proof states. 
Lemma 7, Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 taken together illustrate why similar models with
discrete type spaces lead to efficient states: with discrete type spaces the support of µ
cannot be connected. Thus, renegotiation-proof states need to be separating and this is
only possible with efficient states. In the following we will call states such that supp(µ)
is connected, connected states.
Lemma 10. If θ˜ /∈ supp(µ), C = ((p, q∗(θ˜)), µ) cannot be an element of any set of
renegotiation-proof states.
Proof. From Lemma 9 it follows that we need only to consider connected states C =
((p, q∗(θ)), µ). Suppose θ˜ < min supp(µ) = θ′.20 We show that there exists a set of feasible
and efficient states that make the principal strictly better off. Consider the following set
of contracts: (p(θ), q∗(θ)) with pθ = uqq∗θ and p(θ′) = p+
[
u(q∗(θ′), θ′)− u(q∗(θ˜), θ′)
]
> p.
It follows from Lemma 5 that each type of agent is better off with the contract with his
efficient quality. That is, an agent of type θ is better off with (p(θ), q∗(θ)). The seller is
strictly better off because she can offer to every agent type the efficient quality at a higher
price. Thus, we constructed a set of efficient and separating states that are feasible and
leave the principal better off. As, due to Lemma 7, all efficient and separating states are
20The case θ˜ > max supp(µ) works analogously.
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in every set of renegotiation-proof states, the initial state C could not have been part of
any set of renegotiation-proof states. 
At this point we have shown that renegotiation-proof states must be either efficient
and separating or pooling and connected such that one of the agent types in the support
obtains his efficient quality. We now show that the profit-maximizing set of states among
those states takes the form as described in Theorem 1.
Lemma 11. The profit-maximizing set of states {C(z)}z∈ N among efficient and separat-
ing or pooling and connected states such that one of the agent types in the support obtains
his efficient quality is countably infinite and has the following properties:
(1) (Pooling) For all C(z) = ((p, q), µ) it holds µ0(supp(µ)) > 0
(2) (No distortion at the bottom) C(z) = ((p, q∗(θz), µ) with θz = min(supp(µ)).
Proof. The proof is relegated to the appendix. 
It remains to be shown that a set of states as described in Lemma 11 is indeed
renegotiation-proof.
Lemma 12. Let {C(θz) = (pi, q∗(θz), µz)}z∈N ∈ X(C0) be a set of feasible states starting
from C0 such that µz([θz, θz+1)) = 1. There exists a set of renegotiation-proof states Ω
such that {C(θz)}z∈N ⊂ Ω.
Proof. Let Ω = {C : C is efficient and separating} ∪ {C(θz)}z∈N. Firstly, we consider
external consistency. By Lemma 7, for any state C there exists a set of efficient and
separating states which is feasible and makes the principal weakly better off. Thus, Ω is
externally consistent.
Secondly, we consider internal consistency. Take any C ∈ Ω. If C is efficient and
separating, X(C) = {C}. If C = C(θz) for some z then the only feasible set of states in Ω
that makes the principal weakly better off is a set of efficient and separating states such
that θz obtains the same contract as before. From Lemma 6, it follows that the principal
makes the same profit as before. Thus, internal consistency is not violated. 
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5. The Coase conjecture
In this section we consider the Coase conjecture, which is a special instance of our
set-up. The Coase conjecture argues that if a seller is not able to commit to not selling
a durable good, she can at most charge a price equal to the lowest valuation of the
buyer as long as the cost of the seller is strictly below the buyer’s lowest valuation (gap
case). Whenever the cost of the seller is equal or above the lowest valuation of the buyer
(no-gap case), the seller is able to charge the monopoly price even without commitment
(Ausubel and Deneckere (1989)). Our approach, using renegotiation-proof states, allows
us to rederive this result in a simple manner.
Set up. Consider a monopolistic seller who is selling one object to a buyer. A contract
is a tuple w = (p, q) with p ∈ R specifying the price and q ∈ {0, 1} specifying whether
the good is exchanged (q = 1) or not (q = 0). The seller incurs a cost of c of producing
the good and this cost is common knowledge between the seller and the buyer. Thus, the
utility function of the seller is given by
v(w) = p− cq.
The buyer has a valuation of θ ∈ Θ = [θ, θ¯] for consuming the good, which is private
information to the buyer. Thus, the utility of the buyer is given by
u(w, θ) = θq − p.
The seller’s prior about the valuation of the buyer is given by µ0 ∈ ∆(Θ). To simplify
notation, assume that supp(µ0) = Θ. The initial contract w0 is (0, 0). In the following
we will study two cases; the gap case with c < θ and the no-gap case with c ≥ θ. In the
first case, there is a gap between the cost of the seller and the lowest valuation of the
buyer so it is common knowledge that there are gains from trade. In the second case, the
buyer can have a valuation that makes trading the good inefficient.
The gap case. In what follows we will show that if c < θ, the unique set of renegotiation-
proof states contains only states in which the good is traded. This implies that the
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seller will optimally charge a price equal to the lowest valuation and not propose a new
mechanism after the buyer has accepted.
Proposition 1. Let c < θ , the unique set of renegotiation-proof states Ω that satisfies
the conditions of Definition 3 is Ω = {C = ((p, q) , µ) : q = 1}.
Proof. We show that for a given Ω that is internally and externally consistent, ((p, q), µ)
is in Ω if and only if q = 1.
“if ”: For any state C = ((p, 1), µ) there exists no set of states that would make both
parties weakly better off. Thus, X(C) = {C} . It follows from Lemma 3 that C must be
in Ω.
“only if ”: Let C = ((p, 0) , µ). Consider the contract (p + c + 1/2(θ − c), 1). The buyer
strictly prefers this contract to (p, 0) independent of his type. Moreover the seller is
strictly better off than with contract (p, 0). Thus, {((p+ c+ 1/2(θ − c), 1) , µ)} is feasible
and in X(C). Lemma 4 gives the desired result. 
Proposition 1 implies that starting from a status quo in which the good is not traded,
any final state cannot imply a price charged for the good that is above the lowest valuation
that is in the support of the current belief of the principal. If this is not the case, some
of the types of buyer would optimally choose not to buy the good, which would lead
to q = 0 in some of the states. Such states, however, are not in the unique set of
renegotiation-proof states.
That the set of renegotiation proof states Ω = {C = ((p, q) , µ) : q = 1} is unique im-
plies the following optimization problem of the seller.
max
p
p− c
s.t. p ≤ θ
.
The solution of this problem is the state ((θ, 1) , µ0).
Corollary 1. If c < θ and the seller cannot commit to a mechanism, she can only charge
a price of p = θ.
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This result is in agreement with the literature on the Coase conjecture: the monopolist
competes herself down to the lowest valuation.21
The no-gap case. We now consider c ≥ θ, the no-gap case. In this case, we construct
an internally and externally consistent Ω such that in the optimal set of states within
this Ω, the seller can charge the monopoly price. As the problem of the seller without
commitment is a more constrained version of the problem of a seller with full commitment,
charging the monopoly price must also be the optimal solution without commitment.
Proposition 2. Let pM denote the monopoly price. That is, pM = arg maxp(1−µ0(p))(p−
c) > c. An Ω as defined below is internally and externally consistent.
C = ((p, q) , µ) is in Ω if one of the following holds true
(1) q = 1 and for all θ in supp(µ) it holds θ ≥ c.
(2) q = 0 and for all θ in supp(µ) it holds θ ≤ c.
(3) q = 0, max(supp(µ)) = pM , and there exists an  > 0 such that for all δ ≤  it
holds µ [(c− δ, c+ δ) ∩ supp(µ)] > 0.
Proof. The proof is relegated to the appendix 
The set of renegotiation-proof states Ω consists of three types of sets. The first two
are the efficient states. States in which the good is traded, and the valuations are above
costs (1). States in which the good is not traded and valuations are below costs (2). The
third consists of inefficient states in which the good is not traded, the highest valuation
in the support of the belief of the principal is weakly below the monopoly price, and the
belief puts positive mass on types of agents with valuations arbitrarily close to the cost
(3). Observe that this defines a renegotiation proof set. Firstly, all efficient outcomes
are in Ω. Secondly, with regard to states in (3), the only way to negotiate to other
renegotiation-proof states would imply to offer a price equal to the cost. Thus, the set
of renegotiation-proof states in Proposition 2 is constructed in such a way that the seller
proposes a mechanism that leads to two states: either the object is traded at a price
pM and the seller believes that all buyers have a valuation above pM , or the object is
not traded and the seller beliefs that all buyers have a valuation below pM . Whenever
21See for example Fudenberg et al. (1985), or more recently Strulovici (2017).
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the object is not traded, the only other feasible renegotiation-proof states that make the
principal weakly better off are that the good is traded at a price equal to c or not traded
at all. Thus, the seller cannot profit from proposing a new mechanism whenever the
object is not traded. As charging the monopoly price is the optimal mechanism under
full commitment it must also be the optimal mechanism without commitment.
Corollary 2. If c ≥ θ, the principal can charge the monopoly price pM even without
commitment.
This result is in agreement with the non-cooperative bargaining literature. Ausubel
and Deneckere (1989) show that in the no-gap case, in an infinite-horizon bargaining
game, the seller can sustain the monopoly price in equilibrium if the frictions go to zero.
For a discrete type space, Vartiainen (2013) demonstrated how his solution concept can
recreate the Coase conjecture in the gap case.22 For the no-gap case he writes that, in
principle, it is possible to construct mechanism selection strategies that the principal can
commit to. However, those selection strategies would be complex. Thus, he refrains from
constructing any such strategies and makes the additional assumption that mechanism
selection strategies need to be stationary. In this case, even in the no-gap case, the seller
sells at a price equal to her cost. In this section we demonstrated the simplicity and
cutting power of our approach: to focus on states rather than selection strategies. We
recreated the conceptual difference between the gap and no-gap case without resorting
to complex selection strategies.
6. Comparison with Vartiainen (2013)
In this section we will shortly summarize the approach by Vartiainen (2013). Varti-
ainen argues that sequential rationality of the principal, and the agent’s knowledge of
this, requires that a mechanism selection strategy of the principal σp reflects consistency
and optimization. To be able to define these conditions, we first need to develop some
concepts.
We start by stating the payoff of the principal from using mechanism Mt = (Zt, wt(·))
after history ht given that the agent plays this mechanism optimally in the sense of
22For a comparison of our solution concept with Vartiainen (2013) see Section 6.
34
Lemma 1. As above, denote by νMt ∈ ∆(Zt) the measure on Zt that is induced by the
strategy σa(ht, θ) of the agent and the belief of the principal µt after history ht. The
payoff of the principal can then be written as
V (Mt) =
∫
Zt
v(wt(z))dν
Mt .
Suppose at history ht the principal can commit to following her mechanism selection
strategy in the future. For z ∈ Zt define hzt+1 by hzt+1 = (ht, (Mt, z, wt(z))). We say the
principal will not change a mechanism Mt = (Zt, wt(·)) today given that σp is followed
in the future if for all z ∈ Zt it holds
v(wt(z)) ≥ V (σp(hzt+1)).
That is, after every possible realization of mechanism Mt, the mechanism selection strat-
egy of the principal would prescribe to implementing a mechanism with a weakly lower
expected surplus. Thus, if the principal follows her mechanism selection strategy, in-
dependent of the message of the agent, Mt would not be renegotiated ex post. Such a
mechanism would be played optimally by the agent in the sense of Lemma 1 given the
mechanism selection strategy of the principal.
We denote byMσp(ht) the set of all mechanisms that are truthfully playable at history
ht given that the principal follows her mechanism selection strategy σp afterwards. That
is,
Mσp(ht) =
{
M = (Z, w(z)) ∈M : v(w(z)) ≥ V (σp(hzt+1)) for all z ∈ Z
}
.
We are now in the position to formally specify conditions that Vartiainen (2013) im-
poses on a mechanism selection strategy of the principal. The first condition requires
consistency. That is, employing σp ex-ante should not contradict employing σp ex-post.
The second condition implies optimality. Given σp and ht, the principal should choose
a mechanism that maximizes her payoff in the set Mσp(ht). In particular, under the
hypothesis that σp can be committed to in the future, the principal does not want to
change σp for any message of the agent.
Definition 5. A mechanism selection strategy σp
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(1) is consistent if σp(ht) ∈Mσp(ht) for all ht ∈ H.
(2) is optimal if V (σp(ht)) ≥ V (M) for all M ∈Mσp(ht) for all ht ∈ H.
A thorough discussion of this approach can be found in Vartiainen (2013). Vartianinen
summarizes why Definition 5 implies that the principal can commit to the selection
strategies that are consistent with it as follows. Note that optimality together with
consistency reflects sequential rationality. This is due to the fact that a selection strategy
σp with these properties maximizes the principal’s payoff inMσp . That all states of σp(ht)
are in Mσp(ht) for every history guarantees that this act of optimization is consistent
with foresight. That is, since σp is obeyed in the future, σp ∈ Mσp guarantees that σp
will not be redesigned and thus can be committed to.
Vartiainen (2014) demonstrates that a mechanism selection rule that is consistent and
optimal can be interpreted as a reduced form (weak) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the
mechanism design game as defined in Section 2. That is, the sub-games of this games can
be viewed as single-stage mechanisms that result from a consistent mechanism selection
strategy. In particular, consistency of the mechanism selection rule implies incentive
compatibility of the mechanisms as if a mechanism M is in Mσp at any history it will
not be redesigned ex-post and the agent can play the mechanism optimally.
We are now in a position to compare our solution concept with Vartiainen (2013).
Proposition 3. The following holds true
(1) Let σp be a history independent mechanism selection strategy that is consistent
and optimal (Definition 5). In this case,
⋃
C∈Γ f(σ
p(C), C, σa) is internally and
externally consistent (Definition 3).
(2) For every Ω that is internally and externally consistent such that for all C ∈ Γ
the solution to
max
{C(z)}
∫
Z
v(w(z))dν
s.t. {C(z)) = (w(z), µ(· : z)) : z ∈ Z} ∈ X(C)
{C(z)) = (w(z), µ(· : z)) : z ∈ Z} ⊂ Ω.
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exists, there is a mechanism selection strategy of the principal σp that is consistent
and satisfies the one deviation property such that
⋃
C∈Γ f(σ
p(C), C, σa) ⊂ Ω.23
Proof. The proof is relegated to the appendix. 
On one hand, a history independent, consistent and optimal mechanism selection strat-
egy in the sense of Vartiainen (2013) generates for each subgame a set of states that is
internally and externally consistent. On the other hand, whenever we have a set of
renegotiation-proof states that is internally and externally consistent, the mechanism se-
lection strategy of choosing a mechanism that leads to the principal-optimal renegotiaton-
proof states is a consistent and optimal mechanism selection strategy. Thus, both solution
concepts coincide.
7. Conclusion
The main contribution of this manuscript is to construct the optimal mechanism for
the screening problem of a principal who is not able to commit to not renegotiating any
contract resulting from the mechanism she proposes. In the case of private values with
non-linear contracts, the optimal mechanism is inefficient given that it leads to a pooling
of types. This is different from previous work on contract design without commitment
that find that with private values the principal can only implement efficient contracts.24
With continuous types, we observe a countably infinite number of pooling contracts which
each satisfy a “no-distortion-at-the-bottom” property.
To arrive at the results we characterize the set of renegotiation-proof states by using
internal and external consistency. The main advantage of this approach is that, in contrast
to other definitions of renegotiation-proofness, we do not assume that renegotiation-proof
states must be efficient. This is due to the fact that we do not consider states as blocking
which themselves are subject to renegotiation.
We demonstrate the cutting power of our concept by also considering the Coase con-
jecture. We show that, if there is a gap between the costs of the seller and the lowest
valuation of the buyer, the seller can only charge a price equal to the lowest valuation
23Whether for a given Ω the solution to the maximization problem exists, can be verified directly for
each setting at hand. In our applications in Sections 4 and 5 this is straightforward.
24For example see Gretschko and Wambach (2016), Maestri (2017), Strulovici (2017), and Vartiainen
(2013).
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of the buyer. However, if there is no such gap, the seller is able to charge the monopoly
price even without commitment.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 7.
Proof. Three cases are relevant. Either there exists a type θ˜ in supp(µ) such that q = q∗(θ˜)
or for θ′ = min (supp(µ)) it holds q < q∗(θ′) or for θ′′ = max (supp(µ)) it holds q > q∗(θ′′).
We focus on the first case only, the other cases can be proven analogously.
Let q = q∗(θ˜) for some θ˜ ∈ supp(µ). Consider the following set of efficient and separat-
ing states
{
C(θ) = ((q∗(θ), p(θ)), µθ)
}
such that p(θ˜) = p and pθ(θ) = uq(q∗(θ), θ)q∗(θ).
An agent of type θ˜ will receive the initial contract and an agent of type θ 6= θ˜ will receive
a contract that makes him strictly better off. Thus, this set of states is individually
rational for each type of the agent (condition (i) of Definition 1). Moreover, p(θ) satisfies
equation 3. Thus, this set of states is incentive compatible (condition (ii)) and satisfies
Bayesian consistency (condition (iii)). As a consequence of
pθ(θ)− vq(q∗(θ))q∗θ(θ) = (uqq∗(θ), θ)− vq(q∗(θ)))q∗θ(θ) = 0,
the principal is indifferent between all states in
{
C(θ) = ((q∗(θ), p(θ)), µθ)
}
. In particular,
she is then indifferent between the original state C and any state in
{
C(θ) = ((q∗(θ), p(θ)), µθ)
}
.
Hence, the proposed set of states satisfies individual rationality of the principal (condition
(iv)). Overall, this implies that
{
C(θ) = ((q∗(θ), p(θ)), µθ)
} ∈ X(C).

Proof of Lemma 11. The proof is divided into five steps. We show that
Step 1 In the set of optimal states, higher types obtain higher quality
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Step 2 In the set of optimal states, the seller achieves a weakly higher profit from higher
types
Step 3 Efficient and separating states are not in the set of optimal states
Step 4 For every state in the set of optimal states, the lowest type in the support of the
belief of the principal receives his efficient quality.
Step 5 The set of optimal states is countably infinite.
Denote by {C(z)} the set of feasible, profit-maximizing states for the seller starting from
C0 and by {w(z)} the set of corresponding contracts.
Step 1: In the set of optimal states, higher types obtain higher quality.
Proof. The principal maximizes among efficient and separating or pooling and connected
states such that one of the types receives his efficient quality. Thus, for θ2 > θ1 with q2
and q1 denoting the quality that type θ2 respectively θ1 receives, two cases are relevant.
Firstly, both types obtain their efficient quality q2 = q∗(θ2) and q1 = q∗(θ1). In this case,
as q∗ is an increasing function, q2 > q1. Secondly, both types are in different pooling
states.25 In this case, as one of the types in each pool receives his efficient quality, the
pools are connected and due to the fact that q∗ is an increasing function, q2 > q1. Thirdly,
both types are in the same pooling state. In this case, q2 = q1. Summing up, it follows
that if θ2 > θ1, q2 ≥ q1, that is, higher types receive a higher quality. 
Step 2: In the set of optimal states, the seller achieves a weakly higher profit from higher
types.
Proof. We will show that for any type θ there exists an  > 0 such that for all types θ′ ∈
(θ, θ+ ) the seller realizes an equal or higher profit than with type θ. Let C = ((p, q), µ)
such that θ ∈ supp(µ). If θ < max {supp(µ)} , that is, if C is a pooling and connected
state and θ is not the largest type in the pool, there exists an  > 0 such that all types
θ′ ∈ (θ, θ + ) receive the same contract. Thus, the seller makes the same profit with
all these types. Assume that θ = max {supp(µ)}, that is, assume that θ is the largest
type in the pool or that C is an efficient and separating state. All types θ′ > θ obtain
a different contract than type θ. If there exists an  > 0 such that almost all types in
25Or one of the types receives his efficient quality and the other is in a pooling state.
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θ′ ∈ (θ, θ + ) receive their efficient contract, then the seller makes the same profit from
all of these types (Lemma 6). If type θ also obtains his efficient quality, the seller makes
the same profit from θ and any θ′. If type θ does not obtain his efficient quality, then
the seller makes a strictly larger profit from any type θ′. Thus, assume that for all  > 0
the amount of types in (θ, θ + ) that do not receive their efficient contract is of positive
measure. In this case there exists an  > 0 such that all types in (θ, θ+ ) are in the same
pooling state with a contract wˆ = (pˆ, q∗(θˆ)) for some θˆ. Call this state Cˆ = (wˆ, µˆ). If the
seller obtains the same profit or higher with (pˆ, q∗(θˆ)) than with (p, q), we are done. Thus,
assume that the seller makes less profit with (pˆ, q∗(θˆ)). We will show that there exists a
set of states that makes the seller strictly better off. In this case there exists a type θ′
with θ < θ′ < θˆ and a contract w′ = (p′, q∗(θ′)) such that u¯((p, q), θ) = u¯((p′, q∗(θ′)), θ),
u¯((pˆ, q∗(θˆ)), θˆ) > u¯((p′, q∗(θ′)), θˆ), and v((p′, q∗(θ′)) > (pˆ, q∗(θˆ)). That is, we can find
a contract with an efficient quality for type θ′ ∈ (θ, θˆ). Moreover, type θ is indifferent
between his original contract and the new contract, type θˆ strictly prefers his original
contract, and the principal makes a higher profit from the new contract. Now consider
the following set of states {C(z)} \Cˆ ∪ {C ′, C ′′} with C ′ = (w′, µ′) and C ′′ = (wˆ, µ′′). By
construction, there exists a type θ′′ ∈ (θ, θˆ) such that all types between θ and θ′′ prefer
w′ to w and all types between θ′′ and max {supp(µˆ)} = θ˜ prefer wˆ. Thus, set µ′ such that
it is Bayesian consistent and satisfies supp(µ′) = (θ, θ′′] and µ′′ such that it is Bayesian
consistent and satisfies supp(µ′′) = (θ′′, θ˜). It follows that the constructed set of states,
{C(z)} \Cˆ ∪ {C ′, C ′′}, is feasible and leaves the principal better off. Thus, the original
set of states, {C(z)}, could not have been optimal. 
Step 3: Efficient and separating states are not in the set of optimal states.
Proof. We will show that there is no interval [θ′, θ′′] ⊂ Θ with µ0 ([θ′, θ′′]) > 0 such that
all types θ ∈ [θ′, θ′′] obtain their efficient quality q∗(θ). Denote the set of states that
contain those types by {C(θ)} ⊆ {C(z)} . We will find a different set of states that is
feasible starting from C0 and makes the principal strictly better off. Denote by p′ the
price of the contract that θ′ obtains. Consider the following two contracts w1 = (p′, q∗(θ′))
and w2 = (pˆ, q∗(θˆ)) with θˆ = (1/2)(θ′′ + θ′) and pˆ = u¯(q∗(θ′), θˆ) − p′. Now consider the
following set of states {C(z)} \ {C(θ)} ∪ {C1, C2} with C1 = (w1, µ1) and C2 = (w2, µ2).
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By construction, all types not in [θ′, θ′′] still prefer their old contract w(z) to both w1 and
w2. Types in [θ′, θˆ] prefer w1 to any other contract in {w(z)} \ {w(θ)} . Types in [θˆ, θ′′]
prefer either w2 or some contract in {w(z)} \ {w(θ)} that is also preferred by a higher
type. Thus, there exist Bayesian consistent µ1 and µ2 such that the constructed set of
states {C(z)} \ {C(θ)} ∪ {C1, C2} is feasible starting from C0 and makes the principal
strictly better off.26 
Step 4: For every state in the set of optimal states, the lowest type in the support of the
belief of the principal receives his efficient quality.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a C(zˆ) = (w(zˆ), µ(zˆ)) = ((p, q), µ(zˆ)) ∈
{C(z)} such that min supp(µ) = θ but q > q∗(θ). Consider the following contract
(p′, q∗(θ)) with p′ = u¯(q∗(θ), θ)−u¯(q, θ)+p and the following set of states {C(z)} \ {C(z)}z≥zˆ∪
C ′ ∪
{
Cˆ(z)
}
z>z¯
with C ′ = ((p′, q∗(θ)), µ′) and Cˆ(z) = ((w(z), µˆ(z)). That is, construct a
set of states such that all contracts which are in the new set of states are the same as in
{C(z)} with the exception that (p, q) is swapped for (p′, q∗(θ)). By construction, all types
below θ still prefer their old contract. Moreover, there exists a θ′ > θ such that all types
in [θ, θ′) ⊆ supp(µ) prefer (p′, q∗(θ)) and all types in [θ′,max supp(µ)] prefer one of the
contracts w(z) with z > zˆ. By construction, the principal makes a strictly higher profit
from types in [θ, θ′). Step 1 implies that the principal makes at least as much profit from
types in [θ′,max supp(µ)] as if the set of states were {C(z)}. Thus, there exist Bayesian
consistent µ′ and {µˆ(z)} such that the constructed set of states is feasible starting from
C0 and makes the principal strictly better off.27 
Step 5: The set of optimal states is countably infinite.
Proof. So far we have shown that the optimal set of states partitions
[
θ, θ¯
]
in connected
intervals of strictly positive measure. This implies that if the set of states is infinite it
must be countable. Thus, we merely need to show that the set of optimal states is not
26The idea of this proof is straightforward. If the principal gives each type of agent in some interval his
efficient quality and satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints, she does not earn any additional
rent from higher types by increasing the information rent they earn. If the principal offers two pooling
contracts instead, the information rent to the high types is reduced.
27The idea of the proof is the following. If a pooling state contains a contract where q is optimal for
some intermediate type, the lower types are distorted in the wrong direction. They obtain too much
quality. The seller thus prefers to give some of those types a contract with a lower quality.
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finite. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a θ ∈ Θ = [θ, θ¯] and C = ((p, q∗(θ)), µ) ∈
{C(z)} such that supp(µ) = [θ, θ¯]. Now take any θ′ ∈ (θ, θ¯), consider the contract
w′ = ((p′, q∗(θ′)) with p′ = u¯(q∗(θ′), θ′)− u¯(q∗(θ), θ′)+p, and construct a new set of states
{C(z)} \C ∪{C1, C2} with C1 = ((p, q∗(θ)), µ1) and C2 = ((p′, q∗(θ′)), µ2). Types in [θ, θ′)
prefer (p, q∗(θ)) and types in [θ′, θ¯] prefer (p′, q∗(θ′)). The principal obtains a strictly
higher profit from (p′, q∗(θ′)). Thus, there exist Bayesian consistent µ1 and µ2 such that
the constructed set of states is feasible starting from C0 and makes the principal strictly
better off. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. We start by showing that Ω is externally consistent. Let C = ((p, q) , µ) be not Ω.
Consider the following two states C1 = ((p+ (1− q)c, 1) , µ1) and C2 = ((p− qc, 0) , µ2)
such that µ1(·) = µ(· : θ ≥ c) and µ2(·) = µ(· : θ < c). That is, an state in which the
good is traded at a price of p+(1−q)c and an state in which the object is not traded and
the price is p− qc. We check now whether the conditions of Definition 1 and Definition
2are satisfied and the proposed states are feasible and make the seller weakly better off.
(i) Individual rationality. State C1 is individually rational for buyers with a valuation
above c and state C2 is individually rational for buyers with a valuation below c.
(ii) Incentive compatibility. State C1 is strictly preferred by buyers with a valuation
above c to state C2. State C2 is strictly preferred by buyers with a valuation below c.
The seller does not believe that she is facing buyers with a valuation below c in state C1
and buyers with a valuation above c in state C2.
(iii) Bayesian consistency. The probability of reaching state C1 is µ ((θ, c]) and of
reaching C2 is µ
([
c, θ¯
])
. Thus, µ ((θ, c])µ1 + µ
([
c, θ¯
])
µ2 = µ.
(iv) Individual rationality of the seller. The seller is indifferent between C, C1, and
C2.
Thus, {C1, C2} ∈ X(C) is feasible, makes the seller weakly better off and by definition
of Ω, C1 and C2 are in Ω.
Now that we have shown that Ω is externally consistent we turn our attention to
internal consistency. We show that for all states C ∈ Ω there is no set of feasible states
that is also in Ω and makes the seller strictly better off.
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For every state with q = 1 and θ ≥ c or q = 0 and θ ≤ c for all θ in supp(µ) there
exists no set of states which would make the seller strictly better off and the buyer not
worse off. Thus, any such state cannot be improved.
We turn our attention to states C = ((0, p) , µ) such that max(supp(µ)) = pM and
there exists an  > 0 such that for all δ ≤  it holds µ [(c− δ, c+ δ) ∩ supp(µ)] > 0. Due
to incentive compatibility of the buyer any feasible set of states starting from C consists
of at most two states. One state where the object is exchanged (q = 1) and one where
the object is not exchanged (q = 0). The set of states that merely consists of one state
in Ω with q = 0 either does not make the seller better off or is not individually rational
to the buyer starting from C. The set of states that merely consist of one state in Ω with
q = 1 and a belief such that all θ ≥ c, either does not make the seller better off, due to
µ [(c− δ, c+ δ) ∩ supp(µ)] > 0 or does not satisfy individual rationality of the buyer or
does not satisfy Bayesian consistency. Thus, again due to µ [(c− δ, c+ δ) ∩ supp(µ)] > 0
the only set of feasible states that are in Ω is {C1 = ((p+ c, 1), µ1) , C1 = ((p, 0), µ2)}
with µ1(·) = µ(· : θ ≥ c) and µ2(·) = µ(· : θ < c). However, the seller is indifferent is
indifferent as to whether he does not sell at a price of p or sells at a price of p+ c. Thus,
starting from C = ((0, p) , µ) as defined above, there exists no set of feasible states that is
also in Ω and makes the seller better off. This implies that Ω is internally consistent. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. Ad (i): Let σp be a mechanism selection strategy that is consistent and optimal.
Let Ω =
⋃
C∈Γ f(σ
p(C), C, σa). External consistency follows, by definition, from the fact
that for every C in Γ, f(σp(C), C, σa) is in X(C) and a subset of Ω. It remains to check
that Ω is internally consistent. Let C ∈ Ω and {C(z) = (w(z), µ(z)) : z ∈ Z} ∈ X(C)
with C(z) ∈ Ω for all z ∈ Z and some metric space Z. Denote by M = (Z, w(z))
the mechanism that is induced by {C(z) : z ∈ Z}. As {C(z) : z ∈ Z} is in X(C), M
exists and is well defined. Due to consistency of σp and the fact that C(z) is in Ω it
follows that σp(C(z)) ≤ v(w(z)). Thus, M is inMσp . Due to optimality of σ it follows
that V (σp(C)) ≥ V (M). Thus, again by consistency, V (σp(C)) ≤ v(w) and thereby
V (M) ≤ v(w).
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Ad (ii): Let Ω be externally and internally consistent and let the solution to
(6)
max
{C(z)}
∫
Z
v(w(z))dν
s.t. {C(z)) = (w(z), µ(· : z) : z ∈ Z} ∈ X(C)
{C(z)) = (w(z), µ(· : z) : z ∈ Z} ⊂ Ω.
exist. Define σp as follows. Choose for every C = (w, µ) ∈ Ω, σp(C) = (Z, w(z) ≡ w) and
for C /∈ Ω, σp(C) = (Z, w(z)) such that {C(z) : z ∈ Z} ∈ X(C), {C(z) : z ∈ Z} ⊂ Ω
and {C(z)} is a solution to Problem 6. This is always possible due to external consistency
and the fact that a solution exists. For any C ∈ Γ, f(σp(C), C, σa) is a subset of Ω. Thus,
by definition, for every C ′ = (w′, µ′) ∈ f(σp(C), C, σa), v(w′) ≥ V (σp(C ′)) = v(w′). It
follows that σp(C) is in Mσp(C) and thereby σp is consistent. For optimality take any
M = (Z, w(z)) in Mσp(C). Observe that {C(z) : z ∈ Z} = f(M,C, σa) is feasible and
makes the principal weakly better off. First, suppose that {C(z) : z ∈ Z} ⊂ Ω it follows
from the definition of σp(C) as the solution to Problem (6) that V (σp(C)) ≥ V (M).
Thus, suppose that there exists Z ′ ⊆ Z such that for all z′∈ Z ′, C(z′) /∈ Ω. Consider
the following set of states C = {C(z) : z ∈ Z \ Z ′} ∪ ⋃z′∈Z′ f(σ(C(z′), C(z′), σa). By
definition of σp, C is feasible starting from C and makes the principal weakly better off,
C ⊂ Ω and V (C) ≥ V (M). It follows from the definition of σp as the solution of Problem
(6) that V (σp(C)) ≥ V (C) ≥ V (M). 
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